PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH

Vladimir Soukharev; Basil Hess

Paper 2019/730

PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH

Vladimir Soukharev and Basil Hess

Abstract

We present a post-quantum key agreement scheme that does not require distinguishing between the initiator and the responder. This scheme is based on elliptic curve isogenies and can be viewed as a variant of the well-known SIDH protocol. Then, we present an efficient countermeasure against a side-channel attack that applies to both static and ephemeral versions of SIDH and our scheme. Finally, we show how to obtain an isogeny-based password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on our scheme by applying a construction based on SIDH. Security and computational complexities summaries are also presented.

Note: Revised version to appear

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: isogenies key agreement side-channel attack countermeasure password-authenticated key exchange post-quantum cryptography elliptic curves
Contact author(s): Vladimir Soukharev @ infosecglobal com
Basil Hess @ infosecglobal com
History: 2019-07-18: revised; 2019-06-20: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/730
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/730,
      author = {Vladimir Soukharev and Basil Hess},
      title = {PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/730},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/730}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/730}
}