Paper 2019/899

A Comparison of Single-Bit and Multi-Bit DPA for Attacking AES128 on an ATmega328P

Michael Yonli

Abstract

Side channel attacks have demonstrated in the past that it is possible to break cryptographic algorithms by attacking the implementation rather than the algorithm. This paper compares an adaptation of Paul Kocher's Differential Power Analysis (DPA) for AES with a multi-bit variant by attacking an AES128 implementation for an ATmega328P microcontroller board. The results show that the use of multi-bit DPA can significantly reduce ghost peaks and allow for the recovery of a key with far fewer traces.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
AESDPAmulti-bit DPApower analysisside channel attackmicrocontrollercryptanalysisArduinoATmega328P
Contact author(s)
michiy @ gmx net
History
2019-08-08: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/899
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/899,
      author = {Michael Yonli},
      title = {A Comparison of Single-Bit and Multi-Bit DPA for Attacking AES128 on an ATmega328P},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/899},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/899}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/899}
}
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