Paper 2020/1146
Let's Tessellate: Tiling for Security Against Advanced Probe and Fault Adversaries
Siemen Dhooghe and Svetla Nikova
Abstract
The wire probe-and-fault models are currently the most used models to provide arguments for side-channel and fault security. However, several practical attacks are not yet covered by these models. This work extends the wire fault model to include more advanced faults such as area faults and permanent faults. Moreover, we show the tile probe-and-fault adversary model from CRYPTO 2018's CAPA envelops the extended wire fault model along with known extensions to the probing model such as glitches, transitions, and couplings. In other words, tiled (tessellated) designs offer security guarantees even against advanced probe and fault adversaries. As tiled models use multi-party computation techniques, countermeasures are typically expensive for software/hardware. This work investigates a tiled countermeasure based on the ISW methodology which is shown to perform significantly better than CAPA for practical parameters.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- MaskingNon-InterferenceProbing SecuritySIFA
- Contact author(s)
- siemen dhooghe @ esat kuleuven be
- History
- 2020-09-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1146
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1146,
author = {Siemen Dhooghe and Svetla Nikova},
title = {Let's Tessellate: Tiling for Security Against Advanced Probe and Fault Adversaries},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1146},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1146}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1146}
}
