Paper 2020/237
On Security Notions for Encryption in a Quantum World
Abstract
Indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is usually considered the most desirable security notion for classical encryption. In this work, we investigate its adaptation in the quantum world, when an adversary can perform superposition queries. The security of quantum-secure classical encryption has first been studied by Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13), but they restricted the adversary to classical challenge queries, which makes the indistinguishability only hold for classical messages (IND-qCCA2). We extend their work by giving the first security notions for fully quantum indistinguishability under quantum adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, where the indistinguishability holds for superposition of plaintexts (qIND-qCCA2).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- encryption quantum security
- Contact author(s)
-
celine chevalier @ ens fr
ehsan ebrahimi @ uni lu
qhvu @ ens fr - History
- 2022-09-03: last of 2 revisions
- 2020-02-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/237
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/237,
author = {Céline Chevalier and Ehsan Ebrahimi and Quoc-Huy Vu},
title = {On Security Notions for Encryption in a Quantum World},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/237},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/237}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/237}
}
