Paper 2020/597
Bitstream Modification of Trivium
Kalle Ngo, Elena Dubrova, and Michail Moraitis
Abstract
In this paper we present a bitstream modification attack on the Trivium cipher, an international standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3. By changing the content of three LUTs in the bitstream, we reduce the non-linear state updating function of Trivium to a linear one. This makes it possible to recover the key from 288 keystream bits using at most $2^{19.41}$ operations. We also propose a countermeasure against bitstream modification attacks which obfuscates the bitstream using dummy and camouflaged LUTs which look legitimate to the attacker. We present an algorithm for injecting dummy LUTs directly into the bitstream without causing any performance or power penalty.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- FPGAreverse engineeringbitstream modificationfault injectionstream cipherTrivium
- Contact author(s)
-
kngo @ kth se
dubrova @ kth se
micmor @ kth se - History
- 2020-05-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/597
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/597,
author = {Kalle Ngo and Elena Dubrova and Michail Moraitis},
title = {Bitstream Modification of Trivium},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/597},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/597}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/597}
}
