Paper 2020/937

BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks

Colin O'Flynn

Abstract

Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI) is a well-known technique for performing fault injection attacks. While such attacks may be easy demonstrated in a laboratory condition, information about the applicability of them to real-life environments is critical for designer of ECUs to understand the effort that should be spent on protecting against them. This work targets a recent (2019) automotive ECU, and analyzes the target microcontroller used in laboratory conditions, and then transitions the attack to a real-world “in-situ” attack similar to a garage bench. The specific work appears relevant to several devices in the MPC55xx and MPC56xx series, which are automotive-focused PowerPC devices.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ESCAR Europe 2020
Keywords
fault injectionEMFIsecure bootphysical security
Contact author(s)
colin @ oflynn com
History
2020-09-06: revised
2020-07-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/937
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/937,
      author = {Colin O'Flynn},
      title = {BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/937},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937}
}
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