Paper 2021/1374
Information-Combining Differential Fault Attacks on DEFAULT
Abstract
Differential fault analysis (DFA) is a very powerful attack vector on implementations of symmetric cryptography. Most countermeasures are applied at the implementation level. At ASIACRYPT 2021, Baksi et al. proposed a design strategy that aims to provide inherent cipher level resistance against DFA by using S-boxes with linear structures. They argue that in their instantiation, the block cipher DEFAULT, a DFA adversary can learn at most 64 of the 128 key bits, so the remaining brute-force complexity of
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in EUROCRYPT 2022
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-031-07082-2_7
- Keywords
- Differential Fault Attacks (DFA)CryptanalysisLinear structuresDEFAULT
- Contact author(s)
-
marcel nageler @ iaik tugraz at
christoph @ dobraunig com
maria eichlseder @ iaik tugraz at - History
- 2024-06-07: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-10-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1374
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1374, author = {Marcel Nageler and Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder}, title = {Information-Combining Differential Fault Attacks on {DEFAULT}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1374}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-07082-2_7}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1374} }