Paper 2021/301

Indifferentiable hashing to ordinary elliptic Fq-curves of j=0 with the cost of one exponentiation in Fq

Dmitrii Koshelev

Abstract

Let Fq be a finite field and Eb:y2=x3+b be an ordinary (i.e., non-supersingular) elliptic curve (of j-invariant 0) such that bFq and q1(mod 27). For example, these conditions are fulfilled for the curve BLS12-381 (b=4). It is a de facto standard in the real world pairing-based cryptography at the moment. This article provides a new constant-time hash function H:{0,1}Eb(Fq) indifferentiable from a random oracle. Its main advantage is the fact that H computes only one exponentiation in Fq. In comparison, the previous fastest constant-time indifferentiable hash functions to Eb(Fq) compute two exponentiations in Fq. In particular, applying H to the widely used BLS multi-signature with m different messages, the verifier should perform only m exponentiations rather than 2m ones during the hashing phase.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
cubic residue symbol and cubic rootsindifferentiability from a random oraclepairing-based cryptography
Contact author(s)
dimitri koshelev @ gmail com
History
2021-09-29: last of 7 revisions
2021-03-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/301
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/301,
      author = {Dmitrii Koshelev},
      title = {Indifferentiable hashing to ordinary elliptic $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$-curves of $j=0$ with the cost of one exponentiation in $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/301},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/301}
}
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