Paper 2021/349
Post-quantum Resettably-Sound Zero Knowledge
Nir Bitansky, Michael Kellner, and Omri Shmueli
Abstract
We study post-quantum zero-knowledge (classical) protocols that are sound against quantum resetting attacks. Our model is inspired by the classical model of resetting provers (Barak-Goldreich-Goldwasser-Lindell, FOCS `01), providing a malicious efficient prover with oracle access to the verifier's next-message-function, fixed to some initial random tape; thereby allowing it to effectively reset (or equivalently, rewind) the verifier. In our model, the prover has quantum access to the verifier's function, and in particular can query it in superposition.
The motivation behind quantum resettable soundness is twofold: First, ensuring a strong security guarantee in scenarios where quantum resetting may be possible (e.g., smart cards, or virtual machines). Second, drawing intuition from the classical setting, we hope to improve our understanding of basic questions regarding post-quantum zero knowledge. We prove the following results:
Black-Box Barriers: Quantum resetting exactly captures the power of black-box zero knowledge quantum simulators. Accordingly, resettable soundness cannot be achieved in conjunction with black-box zero knowledge, except for languages in
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Zero knowledgeNon-black-boxResettable SoundnessPost-quantum Cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- omrishmueli @ mail tau ac il
- History
- 2021-03-17: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/349
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/349, author = {Nir Bitansky and Michael Kellner and Omri Shmueli}, title = {Post-quantum Resettably-Sound Zero Knowledge}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/349}, year = {2021}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/349} }