Paper 2021/396

LESS-FM: Fine-tuning Signatures from the Code Equivalence Problem

Alessandro Barenghi, Jean-Francois Biasse, Edoardo Persichetti, and Paolo Santini

Abstract

Code-based cryptographic schemes are highly regarded among the quantum-safe alternatives to current standards. Yet, designing code-based signatures using traditional methods has always been a challenging task, and current proposals are still far from the target set by other post-quantum primitives (e.g. lattice-based). In this paper, we revisit a recent work using an innovative approach for signing, based on the hardness of the code equivalence problem. We introduce some optimizations and provide a security analysis for all variants considered. We then show that the new parameters produce instances of practical interest.

Note: This is the extended version of a work published at PQCrypto 2021. Several parts of this manuscript, most notably those concerning a detailed security analysis (e.g. Section 4, as well as Appendices E and F) have not yet appeared in literature, and are to be considered original work.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. PQCrypto 2021
Keywords
Code-basedPost-QuantumCode EquivalenceSignatures
Contact author(s)
epersichetti @ fau edu
History
2021-08-12: last of 2 revisions
2021-03-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/396
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/396,
      author = {Alessandro Barenghi and Jean-Francois Biasse and Edoardo Persichetti and Paolo Santini},
      title = {LESS-FM: Fine-tuning Signatures from the Code Equivalence Problem},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/396},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/396}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/396}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.