Paper 2021/693
Hardware Penetration Testing Knocks Your SoCs Off
Mark Fischer, Fabian Langer, Johannes Mono, Clemens Nasenberg, and Nils Albartus
Abstract
Today’s society depends on interconnected electronic devices, which handle various sensitive information. Due to the knowledge needed to develop these devices and the economic advantage of reusable solutions, most of these systems contain Third-Party Intellectual Property (3PIP) cores that might not be trustworthy. If one of these 3PIP cores is vulnerable, the security of the entire device is potentially affected. As a result, sensitive data that is processed by the device can be leaked to an attacker. Competitions like Hack@DAC serve as a playground to develop and examine novel approaches and computer-aided tools that identify security vulnerabilities in System-on-Chip (SoC) Register-Transfer-Level (RTL) designs. In this paper, we present a successful divide and conquer approach to test SoC security which is illustrated by exemplary RTL vulnerabilities in the competition’s SoC design. Additionally, we craft real-world software attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. IEEE Design & Test ( Volume: 38, Issue: 1, Feb. 2021)
- DOI
- 10.1109/MDAT.2020.3013730
- Keywords
- Hack@DAC 2019Hardware Penetration TestingRTL BugsSoC DesignHardware SecurityRISC-V CPU
- Contact author(s)
- clemens nasenberg @ rub de
- History
- 2021-05-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/693
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/693,
author = {Mark Fischer and Fabian Langer and Johannes Mono and Clemens Nasenberg and Nils Albartus},
title = {Hardware Penetration Testing Knocks Your SoCs Off},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/693},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1109/MDAT.2020.3013730},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/693}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/693}
}
