Paper 2021/806

Boosting the Security of Blind Signature Schemes

Jonathan Katz, Julian Loss, and Michael Rosenberg

Abstract

Existing blind signature schemes that are secure for polynomially many concurrent executions of the signing protocol are either inefficient or rely on non-standard assumptions (even in the random-oracle model). We show the first efficient blind signature schemes achieving this level of security based on the RSA, factoring, or discrete logarithm assumptions (in the random-oracle model). Our core technique involves an extension and generalization of a transform due to Pointcheval (Eurocrypt '98) that allows us to convert certain blind signature schemes that are secure for (concurrently) issuing logarithmically many signatures into ones secure for (concurrently) issuing polynomially many signatures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2021
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_16
Keywords
blind signaturesdigital signaturesanonymity
Contact author(s)
micro @ cs umd edu
lossjulian @ gmail com
jkatz2 @ gmail com
History
2021-12-10: revised
2021-06-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/806
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/806,
      author = {Jonathan Katz and Julian Loss and Michael Rosenberg},
      title = {Boosting the Security of Blind Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/806},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-92068-5_16},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/806}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/806}
}
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