Paper 2022/042

Inapplicability of Differential Fault Attacks against Cellular Automata based Lightweight Authenticated Cipher

AMBILI K N and JIMMY JOSE

Abstract

Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are a necessity to secure the physical devices connected to the Internet. Two AE schemes, TinyJambu and Elephant, are finalists of NIST lightweight cryptography competition. Another AE scheme, ACORN v3, a CAESAR competition finalist, has been shown to be particularly vulnerable against Differential Fault Attack (DFA), even more than its previous version ACORN v2. TinyJambu is also susceptible to DFA. An optimized interpolation attack has been proposed against one instance of Elephant, Delirium, recently. We propose methods to strengthen these schemes using the Cellular Automata (CA) and increase their resistance to these attacks. The Programmable Cellular Automata (PCA) 90-150 is effectively deployed to make these ciphers robust against DFA. We also provide mathematical analysis of the invigorated schemes and show that significant improvement is achieved in all the three enhanced schemes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
ACORNTinyJambuDifferential Fault AttackOptimized Interpolation AttackCellular AutomataPCA 90-150Authenticated encryption
Contact author(s)
ambili_p180002cs @ nitc ac in
History
2022-01-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/042
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/042,
      author = {AMBILI K N and JIMMY JOSE},
      title = {Inapplicability of Differential Fault Attacks against Cellular Automata based Lightweight Authenticated Cipher},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/042},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/042}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/042}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.