Paper 2022/076

Babylon: Reusing Bitcoin Mining to Enhance Proof-of-Stake Security

Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, Fisher Yu, and Sreeram Kannan

Abstract

Bitcoin is the most secure blockchain in the world, supported by the immense hash power of its Proof-of-Work miners, but consumes huge amount of energy. Proof-of-Stake chains are energy-efficient, have fast finality and accountability, but face several fundamental security issues: susceptibility to non-slashable long-range safety attacks, non-slashable transaction censorship and stalling attacks and difficulty to bootstrap new PoS chains from low token valuation. We propose Babylon, a blockchain platform which combines the best of both worlds by reusing the immense Bitcoin hash power to enhance the security of PoS chains. Babylon provides a data-available timestamping service, securing PoS chains by allowing them to timestamp data-available block checkpoints, fraud proofs and censored transactions on Babylon. Babylon miners merge mine with Bitcoin and thus the platform has zero additional energy cost. The security of a Babylon-enhanced PoS protocol is formalized by a cryptoeconomic security theorem which shows slashable safety and liveness guarantees.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Blockchains
Contact author(s)
nusret @ stanford edu
History
2022-01-20: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/076
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/076,
      author = {Ertem Nusret Tas and David Tse and Fisher Yu and Sreeram Kannan},
      title = {Babylon: Reusing Bitcoin Mining to Enhance Proof-of-Stake Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/076},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/076}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/076}
}
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