Breaking SIDH in polynomial time

Damien Robert

Paper 2022/1038

Breaking SIDH in polynomial time

Damien Robert, Inria Bordeaux - Sud-Ouest Research Centre, Institut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux

Abstract

We show that we can break SIDH in classical polynomial time, even with a random starting curve $E_0$.

Note: Detailed analysis of the dimension 4 attack (and briefly of the dimension 2 attack too)

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: attack sidh
Contact author(s): damien robert @ inria fr
History: 2022-09-11: last of 5 revisions; 2022-08-10: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/1038
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1038,
      author = {Damien Robert},
      title = {Breaking SIDH in polynomial time},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1038},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1038}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1038}
}