Paper 2022/129

TOFU - Toggle Count Analysis made simple

Michael Gruber and Georg Sigl

Abstract

Protection against physical attacks is a major requirement for cryptographic implementations running on devices which are accessible to an attacker. Side-channel attacks are the most common types of physical attacks, the most frequent side-channel is the device's power consumption. In this work we propose a novel open-source tool called TOFU which synthesizes VCD simulation traces into power traces, with adjustable leakage models. Additionally, we propose a workflow which is only based on open-source tools. The functionality of TOFU and the proposed workflow was verified by a CPA of a AES hardware implementation. We also provide numbers for the required running time of TOFU for a trace synthesis with respect to the according VCD file size. Furthermore, we provide TOFU's source code.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Toggle Count AnalysisAESCPA
Contact author(s)
m gruber @ tum de
sigl @ tum de
History
2022-02-13: revised
2022-02-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/129
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/129,
      author = {Michael Gruber and Georg Sigl},
      title = {TOFU - Toggle Count Analysis made simple},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/129},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/129}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/129}
}
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