Paper 2022/1648
Compute, but Verify: Efficient Multiparty Computation over Authenticated Inputs
Abstract
Traditional notions of secure multiparty computation (MPC) allow mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs, but typically do not specify how these inputs are chosen. Motivated by real-world applications where corrupt inputs could adversely impact privacy and operational legitimacy, we consider a notion of authenticated MPC where the inputs are authenticated, e.g., signed using a digital signature by some certification authority. We propose a generic and efficient compiler that transforms any linear secret sharing based honest-majority MPC protocol into one with input authentication.
Our compiler incurs significantly lower computational costs and competitive communication overheads when compared to the best existing solutions, while entirely avoiding the (potentially expensive) protocol-specific techniques and pre-processing requirements that are inherent to these solutions. For
Note: This is the full version of a paper to appear at Asiacrypt 2024, with detailed proofs and discussions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2024
- Keywords
- Multi-Party ComputationAuthenticationAuthenticated MPCDistributed Zero-KnowledgeDistributed Proof of Knowledge
- Contact author(s)
-
moumitadutta @ iisc ac in
chaya @ iisc ac in
sikhar patranabis @ ibm com
nitisin1 @ in ibm com - History
- 2024-12-03: last of 16 revisions
- 2022-11-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1648
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1648, author = {Moumita Dutta and Chaya Ganesh and Sikhar Patranabis and Nitin Singh}, title = {Compute, but Verify: Efficient Multiparty Computation over Authenticated Inputs}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1648}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1648} }