Paper 2022/1701

On Zero-Knowledge Proofs over the Quantum Internet

Mark Carney, Quantum Village Inc.
Abstract

This paper presents a new method for quantum identity authentication (QIA) protocols. The logic of classical zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) due to Schnorr is applied in quantum circuits and algorithms. This novel approach gives an exact way with which a prover $P$ can prove they know some secret by encapsulating it in a quantum state before sending to a verifier $V$ by means of a quantum channel - allowing for a ZKP wherein an eavesdropper or manipulation can be detected with a fail-safe design. This is achieved by moving away from the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem towards the hardness of estimating quantum states. This paper presents a method with which this can be achieved and some bounds for the security of the protocol provided. With the anticipated advent of a `quantum internet', such protocols and ideas may soon have utility and execution in the real world.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. arXiv
DOI
10.48550/arXiv.2212.03027
Keywords
quantum internetzero-knowledge proofsquantum communicationsquantum identity authentication
Contact author(s)
mark @ quantumvillage org
History
2023-02-11: last of 4 revisions
2022-12-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1701
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1701,
      author = {Mark Carney},
      title = {On Zero-Knowledge Proofs over the Quantum Internet},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1701},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2212.03027},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1701}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1701}
}
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