Paper 2022/443

Attack on SHealS and HealS: the Second Wave of GPST

Steven D. Galbraith, University of Auckland
Yi-Fu Lai, University of Auckland
Abstract

We cryptanalyse the isogeny-based public key encryption schemes SHealS and HealS, and the key exchange scheme HealSIDH of Fouotsa and Petit from Asiacrypt 2021.

Note: -Update- May 10th 2022: generalise the generalised attack in the appendix. Apr 27th 2023: update publication information.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. PQCrypto2022
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_19
Keywords
Post-quantum cryptographyisogeny cryptographcryptanalysisSIDHSIKEadaptive attacksGPST attack
Contact author(s)
s galbraith @ auckland ac nz
27182818284fu lai @ gmail com
History
2023-04-27: last of 2 revisions
2022-04-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/443
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/443,
      author = {Steven D.  Galbraith and Yi-Fu Lai},
      title = {Attack on SHealS and HealS: the Second Wave of GPST},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/443},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_19},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/443}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/443}
}
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