Paper 2022/625

Dashing and Star: Byzantine Fault Tolerance with Weak Certificates

Abstract

State-of-the-art Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols assuming partial synchrony such as SBFT and HotStuff use \textit{regular certificates} obtained from $$ (partial) signatures. We show that one can use \textit{weak certificates} obtained from only $$ signatures to \textit{assist} in designing more robust and more efficient BFT protocols. We design and implement two BFT systems: Dashing (a family of two HotStuff-style BFT protocols) and Star (a parallel BFT framework). We first present Dashing1 that targets both efficiency and robustness using weak certificates. Dashing1 is also network-adaptive in the sense that it can leverage network connection discrepancy to improve performance. We show that Dashing1 outperforms HotStuff in various failure-free and failure scenarios. We then present Dashing2 enabling a \textit{one-phase} fast path by using \textit{strong certificates} from $$ signatures. We then leverage weak certificates to build Star, a highly scalable BFT framework that delivers transactions from $$ replicas. Star compares favorably with existing protocols in terms of liveness, communication, state transfer, scalability, and/or robustness under failures. We demonstrate that Dashing achieves 47\%-107\% higher peak throughput than HotStuff for experiments on Amazon EC2. Meanwhile, unlike all known BFT protocols whose performance degrades as $$ grows large, the peak throughput of Star increases as $$ grows. When deployed in a WAN with 91 replicas across five continents, Star achieves an impressive throughput of 256 ktx/sec, 2.38x that of Narwhal.