Paper 2022/655

Bit Security as Cost to Demonstrate Advantage

Keewoo Lee, UC Berkeley
Abstract

We revisit the question of what the definition of bit security should be, previously answered by Micciancio-Walter (Eurocrypt 2018) and Watanabe-Yasunaga (Asiacrypt 2021). Our new definition is simple, but (i) captures both search and decision primitives in a single framework like Micciancio-Walter, and (ii) has a firm operational meaning like Watanabe-Yasunaga. It also matches intuitive expectations and can be well-formulated regarding Hellinger distance. To support and justify the new definition, we prove several classic security reductions with respect to our bit security. We also provide pathological examples that indicate the ill-definedness of bit security defined in Micciancio-Walter and Watanabe-Yasunaga.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IACR CiC
Keywords
bit securitysecurity definitionHellinger distance
Contact author(s)
keewoo lee @ berkeley edu
History
2024-04-06: revised
2022-05-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/655
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/655,
      author = {Keewoo Lee},
      title = {Bit Security as Cost to Demonstrate Advantage},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/655},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/655}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/655}
}
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