Paper 2023/470

GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges

Hugo Beguinet, École Normale Supérieure - PSL, French National Centre for Scientific Research, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation, Thales (France)
Céline Chevalier, Pantheon-Sorbonne University, École Normale Supérieure - PSL, French National Centre for Scientific Research, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation
David Pointcheval, École Normale Supérieure - PSL, French National Centre for Scientific Research, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation
Thomas Ricosset, Thales (France)
Mélissa Rossi, ANSSI
Abstract

Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) have become a key building block in many security products as they provide interesting efficiency/security trade-offs. Indeed, a PAKE allows to dispense with the heavy public key infrastructures and its efficiency and portability make it well suited for applications such as Internet of Things or e-passports. With the emerging quantum threat and the effervescent development of post-quantum public key algorithms in the last five years, one would wonder how to modify existing password authenticated key exchange protocols that currently rely on Diffie-Hellman problems in order to include newly introduced and soon-to-be-standardized post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM). A generic solution is desirable for maintaining modularity and adaptability with the many post-quantum KEM that have been introduced. In this paper, we propose two new generic and natural constructions proven in the Universal Composability (UC) model to transform, in a black-box manner, a KEM into a PAKE with very limited performance overhead: one or two extra symmetric encryptions. Behind the simplicity of the designs, establishing security proofs in the UC model is actually non-trivial and requires some additional properties on the underlying KEM like fuzziness and anonymity. Luckily, post-quantum KEM protocols often enjoy these two extra properties. As a demonstration, we prove that it is possible to apply our transformations to Crystals-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum KEM that will soon be standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In a nutshell, this work opens up the possibility to securely include post-quantum cryptography in PAKE-based real-world protocols.

Note: Short revision on anonymity property.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (2023)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-33491-7_19
Keywords
Key Encapsulation MechanismPassword-Authenticated Key ExchangeUniversal Composability
Contact author(s)
hugo beguinet @ ens fr
celine chevalier @ ens fr
david pointcheval @ ens fr
thomas ricosset @ thalesgroup com
melissa rossi @ ens fr
History
2024-01-22: revised
2023-03-31: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/470
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/470,
      author = {Hugo Beguinet and Céline Chevalier and David Pointcheval and Thomas Ricosset and Mélissa Rossi},
      title = {GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/470},
      year = {2023},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-33491-7_19},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/470}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/470}
}
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