Paper 2024/028

Lattice-Based Functional Commitments: Fast Verification and Cryptanalysis

Abstract

A functional commitment allows a user to commit to an input $\mathbf{x}\in \{0,1{\}}^{\ell }$ and later open up the commitment to a value $y=f(\mathbf{x})$ with respect to some function $f$. In this work, we focus on schemes that support fast verification. Specifically, after a preprocessing step that depends only on $f$, the verification time as well as the size of the commitment and opening should be sublinear in the input length $\ell$, We also consider the dual setting where the user commits to the function $f$ and later, opens up the commitment at an input $\mathbf{x}$. In this work, we develop two (non-interactive) functional commitments that support fast verification. The first construction supports openings to constant-degree polynomials and has a shorter CRS for a broad range of settings compared to previous constructions. Our second construction is a dual functional commitment for arbitrary bounded-depth Boolean circuits. Both schemes are lattice-based and avoid non-black-box use of cryptographic primitives or lattice sampling algorithms. Security of both constructions rely on the $$-succinct short integer solutions (SIS) assumption, a falsifiable $$-type generalization of the SIS assumption (Preprint 2023). In addition, we study the challenges of extending lattice-based functional commitments to extractable functional commitments, a notion that is equivalent to succinct non-interactive arguments (when considering openings to quadratic relations). We describe a general methodology that heuristically breaks the extractability of our construction and provides evidence for the implausibility of the knowledge $$-$$-$$ assumption of Albrecht et al. (CRYPTO 2022) that was used in several constructions of lattice-based succinct arguments. If we additionally assume hardness of the standard inhomogeneous SIS assumption, we obtain a direct attack on a variant of the extractable linear functional commitment of Albrecht et al.