Paper 2024/1694

Full Key-Recovery Cubic-Time Template Attack on Classic McEliece Decapsulation

Abstract

Classic McEliece is one of the three code-based candidates in the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process in the Key Encapsulation Mechanism category. As such, its decapsulation algorithm is used to recover the session key associated with a ciphertext using the private key. In this article, we propose a new side-channel attack on the syndrome computation in the decapsulation algorithm that recovers the private key, which consists of the private Goppa polynomial $$ and the permuted support $$. The attack relies on both practical aspects and theoretical contributions, namely that the side-channel distinguisher can accurately discriminate elements of the permuted support $$, while relying only on a standard noisy Hamming weight leakage assumption and that there exists a cubic-time algorithm that uses this information to recover the private Goppa polynomial $$. Compared with previous work targeting the Classic McEliece private key, this drastically improves both on the assumptions made in the attacker model and on the overall efficiency of the key-recovery algorithm. We have carried out the attack in practice on a microcontroller target running the reference implementation of Classic McEliece, and make the full attack source code available.