Paper 2024/285
Mirrored Commitment: Fixing ``Randomized Partial Checking'' and Applications
Abstract
Randomized Partial Checking (RPC} was proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest and attracted attention as an efficient method of verifying the correctness of the mixing process in numerous applied scenarios. In fact,
RPC is a building block for many electronic voting schemes, including Prêt à Voter, Civitas, Scantegrity II as well as voting-systems used in real-world elections (e.g., in Australia). Mixing is also used in anonymous transfers of cryptocurrencies.
It turned out, however, that a series of works showed, however,
subtle issues with analyses behind RPC. First, that the actual
security level of the RPC protocol is way off the claimed bounds. The probability of successful manipulation of
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACNS'24
- Keywords
- randomized partial checkingmixinganonymityvotingintegrityrapid mixingMarkov Chaincryptocurrencies
- Contact author(s)
-
Pawel Lorek @ math uni wroc pl
motiyung @ gmail com
filip zagorski @ gmail com - History
- 2024-02-23: approved
- 2024-02-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/285
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/285, author = {Paweł Lorek and Moti Yung and Filip Zagórski}, title = {Mirrored Commitment: Fixing ``Randomized Partial Checking'' and Applications}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/285}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/285} }