Paper 2025/444

Multiparty Garbling from OT with Linear Scaling and RAM Support

David Heath, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Vladimir Kolesnikov, Georgia Institute of Technology
Varun Narayanan, University of California, Los Angeles
Rafail Ostrovsky, University of California, Los Angeles
Akash Shah, University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract

State-of-the-art protocols that achieve constant-round secure multiparty computation currently present a trade-off: either consume an amount of communication that scales quadratically in the number of parties, or achieve better asymptotics at the cost of high constant factors (e.g. schemes based on LPN or DDH). We construct a constant-round MPC protocol where communication scales linearly in the number of parties n. Our construction relies only on OT and RO, and it leverages packed secret sharing. Due to building on simple primitives, our protocol offers concrete improvement over asymptotically-efficient LPN-based schemes. We consider security in the presence of a dishonest majority where the malicious (with abort) adversary corrupts an arbitrary constant fraction of parties. By leveraging tri-state circuits (Heath et al. Crypto 2023), we extend our protocol to the RAM model of computation. For a RAM program that halts within steps, our maliciously-secure protocol communicates total bits, where is a security parameter.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Garbling SchemeConstant roundMultiparty Computation
Contact author(s)
daheath @ illinois edu
kolesnikov @ gatech edu
varunnkv @ gmail com
rafail @ cs ucla edu
akashshah08 @ g ucla edu
History
2025-03-10: approved
2025-03-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/444
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/444,
      author = {David Heath and Vladimir Kolesnikov and Varun Narayanan and Rafail Ostrovsky and Akash Shah},
      title = {Multiparty Garbling from {OT} with Linear Scaling and {RAM} Support},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/444},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/444}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.