Paper 2025/456

A Democratic Distributed Post-Quantum Certificateless Encryption Scheme

Thomas Prévost, Université Côte d'Azur
Bruno Martin, Université Côte d'Azur
Olivier Alibart, Université Côte d'Azur
Abstract

We propose a post-quantum certificateless encryption scheme based on a web of trust instead of a centralized Key Generation Center. Our scheme allows nodes to communicate securely. It is the nodes already present in the network that vote on the acceptance of new nodes, and agree on the shared key. The threshold required for the acceptance of a new node is configurable. Our protocol thus allows to completely operate without the Key Generation Center (or Key Distribution Center). Our scheme is based on Quasi-Cyclic Moderate Density Parity Check Code McEliece, which is resistant to quantum computer attacks. The voting system uses Shamir secret sharing, coupled with the Kabatianskii-Krouk-Smeets signature scheme, both are also resistant to quantum computer attacks. We provide a security analysis of our protocol, as well as a formal verification and a proof of concept code.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Certificateless encryptionQC-MDPC McEliecePost-quantum encryptionWeb of trustDistributed Identity ManagementKKS
Contact author(s)
thomas prevost @ univ-cotedazur fr
bruno martin @ univ-cotedazur fr
olivier alibart @ univ-cotedazur fr
History
2025-03-12: approved
2025-03-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/456
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/456,
      author = {Thomas Prévost and Bruno Martin and Olivier Alibart},
      title = {A Democratic Distributed Post-Quantum Certificateless Encryption Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/456},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/456}
}
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